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Abstract 
We investigate whether the so-called textual sentiment has any impact on European 
depositors’ behavior to withdraw their deposits. After the manual collection of monthly 
speeches of the president of the European Central Bank (ECB hereafter) we apply textual 
analysis techniques following the methodology of Loughran and McDonald (2011) and we 
construct two alternative sentiments able to capture the perceived uncertainty. We find that 
high frequency of uncertainty and weak modal words in the monthly speeches of the 
president of the ECB leads both households and non-financial corporations to withdraw 
their bank deposits. We also find that these textual sentiments have greater impact on non-
financial corporations. These findings suggest that regulators and policy makers could 
expand the already existing early-warning systems for the banking sector by taking into 
consideration the frequency of uncertainty and weak modal words in the ECB president’s 
speeches. 
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“Central bank communication can be a powerful monetary policy tool.” 
European Parliament-Monetary Dialogue, September 20181 
 
1. Introduction 
The theme of bank deposit flows and bank runs2 is in general one of the fundamental 
drivers of financial instability and draws high attention from the banking literature, 
regulators and creditors. Fluctuations in bank deposits can disturb both aggregate 
investment and aggregate consumption causing substantial effects in the macroeconomic 
environment. Pursuant to Demirguç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998), excessive deposit 
withdrawals may lead to a banking crisis which in turn could disturb or even suspend the 
credit flows both to households and firms, hence reducing both investment and 
consumption and therefore possibly compelling even sustainable firms into bankruptcy. 
Thus, it becomes apparent that inordinate bank deposit outflows have a profound impact 
on the general macroeconomic environment. 
Over the last years a fast-growing literature has tried to investigate the nature of bank 
runs and depositors’ behavior. In this study, we shed light on this issue by introducing, for 
the first-time, textual analysis techniques in the bank deposit flows literature. Following 
the methodology of Loughran and McDonald (2011), we construct two textual sentiment 
variables focusing on uncertainty and weak modal words appearing in the monthly 
speeches of the ECB’s president. We do not take into consideration alternative word lists 
to measure the so-called document tone or textual sentiment since earlier studies suggested 
that there is limited incremental value for other word lists reflecting litigious or positive 
                                                 
1
 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/153223/CASE_final.pdf  
2
 A bank run arises when an economy faces great amounts of deposit withdrawals. When depositors start to 
take out their deposits in a non-discriminatory manner (even from non-financially distressed banks) this may 
provoke a banking panic, or even engender a systemic banking crisis (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983). 
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sentiment (Tetlock, 2007; Loughran and McDonald, 2011; Gandhi et. al., 2019). 
After the construction of these two textual sentiment variables, we employ them as 
direct measures of the depositors’ perceived fear. ECB president’s monthly speeches 
provide an opportunity to depositors to look at the state of the economy through his eyes. 
We argue that these two textual sentiment metrics can serve as a qualitative and valid 
disclosure for depositors to evaluate any risks when they conduct short-term projections of 
the future economic conditions. Specifically, increased uncertainty within the ECB 
president’s monthly speeches might increase the perceived fear of depositors, thereby 
leading to bank deposit outflows. 
Our study makes several significant contributions to the literature on bank deposits. 
First, the forward-looking uncertainty measures echoing through the ECB president’s 
monthly speeches should act as early warning signals of potential bank runs. Identifying 
the reasons why banks are subject to unexpected deposit outflows is crucial. Any 
methodology that even marginally augments our knowledge is advantageous, as it enables 
regulators to intervene quickly lest a severe systemic banking crisis appears. Second, when 
the economic conditions in the European economy are deteriorating, the ECB president 
may unconsciously propagate uncertainty via his speeches, which further spreads fear 
among depositors and hence jeopardizing the banking system due to mass deposit 
withdrawals. We find that linguistic cues in the ECB president’s speeches in a certain 
month with a higher fraction of uncertainty words lead to greater deposits outflows in the 
next month. In other words, an overly pessimistic speech from the ECB president could act 
as a self-fulfilling destructive prophecy mechanism, even if it may be activated 
unintentionally. Third, we investigate potential asymmetries between the two major types 
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of depositors, that is households and firms, with the latter exhibiting higher sensitivity since 
firms usually have a greater information set and they are also more aware of the general 
economic environment. Finally, we document that textual analysis is a promising 
methodology for the banking literature, since our findings intimate that textual analysis can 
enhance our capacity to understand the effect of information on bank deposits. 
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study examining whether textual 
sentiment impacts on total deposit flows as well as on deposit flows by sector, that is 
households and non-financial corporations. Our analysis provides the following key 
results. First, textual sentiment exerts a significant impact on European depositors’ 
behavior over and above the usual macroeconomic fundamentals and hence it can serve as 
an early warning indicator for deposit flows. Second, textual sentiment has a greater impact 
on non-financial corporations than on households, indicating that firms are more cognizant 
of what the president of the ECB is saying. Finally, our findings provide empirical evidence 
for the theoretical models of self-fulfilling prophecy and uncertainty. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a review of past 
literature. Section 3 describes the data and the variables we employ. Sections 4 and 5 
contain the econometric methodologies we employ, and the estimation results respectively. 
Finally, Section 6 concludes. 
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2. Review of the literature 
Many studies have been conducted in recent decades trying to explain the causes 
behind bank deposits flows and bank runs. Starting with the first strand of the relevant 
literature, bank runs (i.e. inordinate deposit outflows) are assumed to be caused as random 
incidents (“sunspots”) taking place as a result of depositors’ coordination problems 
(Diamond and Dybvig, 1983; Waldo, 1985; Wallace, 1988; Engineer, 1989; Peck and 
Shell, 2003). 
Unlike the idea that bank runs are like “sunspot” occurrences, it has also been 
conducted an extensive literature supporting the opposite. Gorton (1988) was the pioneer 
of this strand of the literature. He shaped a different explanation of why a bank could face 
excessive bank deposit outflows and nominated that bank runs are engendered because of 
asymmetric information between financial institutions and depositors. After his pioneering 
work, a rapidly growing literature appeared supporting that bank runs are based on bank-
specific and macroeconomic fundamentals and they are not occasioned like “sunspots” or 
by self-fulfilling prophecies (Alonso, 1996; Allen and Gale, 1998; Demirguç-Kunt and 
Detragiache, 1998; Schumacher, 2000; Calomiris and Mason, 2000; Goldstein and 
Pauzner, 2005; Levy-Yeyati et. al., 2010).  
Apart from all the previous studies, there is also a widespread literature supporting that 
depositors’ actions are not determined neither by “sunspots” nor by fundamentals but by 
other reasons such as depositors' network or personal beliefs and attitudes (Martinez-Peria 
and Schmukler, 2001; Iyer and Puri, 2012; Osili and Paulson, 2014; Oliveira et. al., 2014; 
Nys et. al., 2015; Brown et. al., 2020). 
In this study, we incorporate textual analysis techniques and we propose an alternative 
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approach for the explanation of European depositors’ behavior. Our results differ from the 
already existing literature, providing new evidence in favor that textual sentiment is an 
important driving force behind bank runs.  
Textual sentiment analysis, as a rapidly emerging body of research, resides across 
many areas in finance. For example, Ferris et. al., (2013) and Loughran and McDonald 
(2013) focus on the textual sentiment of IPO prospectuses with emphasis on the 
underpricing phenomenon. Both studies suggest that an IPO pricing is lowballed when 
there is a high frequency of negative words within IPO prospectus. Furthermore, Gandhi 
et. al., (2019) implement textual analysis on bank annual reports to construct a proxy for 
financial distress. They document that high levels of negative words are related to a greater 
delisting likelihood. Moreover, Katsafados et. al., (2019), studying the behavior of bank 
mergers, emphasize that negative (positive) sentiment of annual reports implies a higher 
probability of becoming target (bidder). Finally, Hoberg and Phillips (2010), employing a 
textual-based analysis of 10-K product descriptions, suggest that product differentiation 
exploited via mergers and acquisitions increase product market synergies. 
3. Data and Variables  
3.1 Dependent variables 
Our dataset covers 27-EU countries3 on a monthly frequency spanning from 2008M2 
to 2017M2. The dependent variable is the total aggregate bank deposit transaction flows 
(DFLOWS). DFLOWS attain negative (positive) values when a country witnesses deposit 
outflows (inflows).  
                                                 
3
 In our analysis, we do not include Denmark due to lack of data availability.  
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Table 1 reports the main descriptive statistics of DFLOWS by country. It becomes 
evident that Italy and Spain are the countries which have witnessed the largest deposit 
outflows, while United Kingdom seems to have the greatest deposit inflows for the under-
examination period. In addition, Greece is the only country that seems to have on average 
negative deposit flows over the sample period. Moreover, we take into consideration the 
aggregate bank deposit transaction flows separately by sector, that is non-financial 
corporations (DFLOWS_F) and households and non-profit institutions (DFLOWS_H). We 
collect the three types of deposits from the ECB’s Statistical Data Warehouse. 
*****Insert Table 1 here***** 
3.2 Textual Analysis 
As a first step, we manually collect all the ECB president’s speeches from the ECB 
website over February 2008 to February 2017, including merely those that are in English 
language. This yields a sample of 274 speeches. Second, for each individual retrieved 
speech, we follow the parsing process aligned with the methodology of Loughran and 
McDonald (2013). It should be mentioned, however, that following Gandhi et. al., (2019) 
we purge each text (speech) by eliminating all abbreviations, acronyms, generic stop 
words, single letter words, numbers and punctuation marks.  
Most of the textual analysis literature in finance still proceeds within the Bag-of-
Words framework (Loughran and McDonald, 2016). Particularly, the aforementioned 
purified text is deconstructed into vectors of word counts, where we can then employ 
predefined word lists to gauge speeches' tone. Our sentiment analysis is based on the 
commonly used Loughran and McDonald (2011) lists of uncertainty and weak modal 
words (L&M lists).  
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Most studies perform textual analysis to construct sentiment measures using a 
proportional weighting scheme (Kearney and Liu, 2014). Consistent with this branch of 
literature, our analysis proceeds with this method which assigns equal weight to each word 
in the text. In practice, our algorithm computes the proportion of uncertainty 
(UNCERTAINTY) and weak modal (MODAL_WEAK) words based on L&M sentiment 
categories, always in relation to the total word count in each speech as normalization4. 
Then, we form the principal hypothesis that the frequency of weak modal and uncertain 
words (that is, the magnitude of ex-ante uncertainty5) exerts negative impact on the 
depositors’ behavior. 
We deem it appropriate to present some words that belong to the uncertainty and the 
weak modal word lists, to facilitate understanding of what kind of emotional stimuli these 
word lists emit regarding financial stability. The former list includes 291 words, such as 
doubt, fluctuate, exposure, riskier, speculate and depend, while the latter is a subset of 
uncertainty word list and contains merely 27 words, such as might, may, perhaps, possible 
and seldom. 
3.3 Control Variables 
Apart from the two main explanatory variables, we also control for as many and 
relevant country-specific characteristics as possible to reduce any possible unobserved 
heterogeneity concerns and omitted variable bias. Especially, we take into consideration 
LTGBY which is the long term (10-year) government bond yield, IPI denoting the 
                                                 
4If there is more than one speech in the same month, then the final sentiment score for that month is the 
average of the individual scores. 
5This term was first employed by Loughran and McDonald (2013). 
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industrial production index6, ESI standing for the economic sentiment indicator, 
UNEMPLOYMENT which indicates the unemployment rate and SHARE_PRICES is the 
share price index of each country’s stock market. We express all control variables in 
percentage changes. The choice of these macro-controls mirrors both the data availability 
and the background theory. 
In Table 2, we provide a brief definition for each variable, its expected sign and the 
source from which we obtain the data. 
*****Insert Table 2 here***** 
4. Econometric Methodology 
Before we proceed to the estimation models and the econometric methodologies we 
employ, we deem it appropriate to examine the trajectory between DFLOWS and each type 
of textual sentiment. As Figure 1 depicts, the movements of European bank deposits are 
clearly shadowed by the intensity of each type of textual sentiment. In particular, the 
periods of negative deposit flows (drop in deposits) coincide with periods of increased 
textual (crisis) sentiment intensity. Both upper and lower graph demonstrate an inverse 
relationship between the previously mentioned variables, thus indicating negative expected 
sign for each type of textual sentiment. This distinct negative association between the two 
textual sentiment indicators and the European bank deposit flows offers tentative evidence 
supporting our hypothesis, which must, however, be confirmed in a context of a formal 
econometric setup.  
                                                 
6Given that data for real GDP on a monthly frequency are not available we employ IPI as a proxy for GDP 
growth. 
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*****Insert Figure 1 here***** 
Given that i, t and j denote country, time (months) and the type of each textual 
sentiment variable respectively we begin by estimating the following dynamic econometric 
specification:  
 𝐷𝐹𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑆𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑎𝑗 + 𝛽𝑗𝐷𝐹𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜃𝑗𝑇𝐸𝑋𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1  + 𝛿 𝑗𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡𝑗   (1) (1) 
where TEXT represents the type of each textual sentiment we use (i.e. UNCERTAINTY 
and MODAL_WEAK), X is a vector of country-control variables and ε is the stochastic 
term.  
We specify a dynamic model incorporating DFLOWS on the right-hand side of the 
equation in one lagged period. The reason behind the dynamic nature of our model is 
twofold. First, because such a model specification captures any possible persistence of 
DFLOWS and second, because we want to eliminate the potential bias due to omitted 
explanatory variables. Since all models include DFLOWS in one period lag as independent 
variable, this may lead to endogeneity issues. In order to eliminate any possible 
endogeneity concerns we apply the system Generalized Method of Moments method 
(system-GMM hereafter)7 of Blundell and Bond (1998) with robust standard errors. As 
instruments we use lagged values of both dependent and explanatory variables. The number 
of lags we employ in each econometric specification was selected in such a way that these 
instruments to be in line with the results of both the Arellano-Bond autocorrelation test and 
the Sargan over identification test respectively.  
                                                 
7The Difference-GMM approach, firstly proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) was not preferred because 
according to the literature it suffers from poor accuracy in simulation and from significant finite-sample bias. 
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Then, we proceed to explore whether UNCERTAINTY and MODAL_WEAK have 
a symmetric impact on each type of DFLOWS, that is DFLOWS_F and DFLOWS_H 
respectively. To this end, we apply the methodology of Seemingly Unrelated Regressions 
(SUR), firstly proposed by Zellner (1962). The main advantage of the SUR estimation 
method is that it allows the error terms to be correlated across the equations. The SUR 
estimation is also employed, because it permits for tests of cross-equation constraints. Our 
prior belief is that the impact of UNCERTAINTY and MODAL_WEAK would be greater 
on DFLOWS_F than DFLOWS_H since, in general, firms are more aware of what the 
ECB president says.  
According to Campbell (2006) households, to some extent, are not adequately 
educated to evaluate financial information on their own. Given that households realize 
their own limitations, they do not undertake some financial decisions because they do not 
feel qualified enough (Campbell, 2006). On the contrary, in most cases, corporations have 
the required resources, not only for the monitoring mechanisms with which they gather 
information, but also for having the qualified staff to process and use that information 
effectively. Therefore, given that firms have in their possession a greater information set, 
a natural inference is that the ECB president’s speeches would probably exert a greater 
impact on firms’ decisions to withdraw their bank deposits than on households. 
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5. Empirical Findings 
5.1 Baseline regressions 
The results8 with the system-GMM approach are reported in Table 3 while the results 
with the SUR methodology are reported in Table 4. Starting with the results of Table 3, we 
find that the estimated coefficient of UNCERTAINTY is negative (-2.440) and statistically 
significant at the 10% level, while the estimated coefficient of MODAL_WEAK is also 
negative (-5.678) and statistically significant at the 5% level. Thus, a more uncertain and 
weak modal language in the monthly speeches of the ECB president is associated with 
higher deposit outflows. Simply put, a more pessimistic sentiment in a speech of the ECB 
president foreshadows bank deposit outflows. Our results indicate that when firms and 
households realize higher uncertainty and weak modal words in a speech of the ECB 
president, then in the subsequent month their perceived fear increases, which in turn leads 
them to withdraw their bank deposits. Therefore, the hypothesis that higher levels of textual 
sentiment are mapped onto higher deposit withdrawals is supported by the data. 
As far as the macroeconomic-control variables are concerned, only SHARE_PRICES 
was found to be statistically significant at the 10% level and with the expected positive 
sign, suggesting that a country with a flourishing stock market experiences higher deposit 
inflows due to boosted economic confidence.  
In addition, we find a high degree of persistence of DFLOWS, with the previous 
month’s DFLOWS affecting the present month’s DFLOWS by almost 96%. This suggests 
                                                 
8We have also examined the behavior of UNCERTAINTY and MODAL_WEAK when all explanatory 
variables are expressed in one period lag instead of being included in the models in the current period. For 
space conservation reasons, we do not provide a detailed discussion. However, the results are compatible 
with the baseline results and can be provided upon request. 
 
13 
 
that a negative shock to DFLOWS will have a prolonged effect on the banking sector and 
it will take time for DFLOWS to recover. 
Furthermore, the Arellano-Bond tests reject the null hypothesis of no first order serial 
correlation, but they do not reject the hypothesis that the errors are not autocorrelated in 
the second order. Thus, the system-GMM results are consistent. Moreover, the Sargan test 
suggests that the imposed overidentifying restrictions are valid and the instruments are 
appropriate. 
*****Insert Table 3 here***** 
Next, in Table 4, we observe that the coefficients of both textual sentiments in the 
households' equation are not statistically significant. Nevertheless, both textual variables 
exert significant impact on DFLOWS_F. Furthermore, the cross equation joint zero effect 
test is rejected, suggesting that each textual sentiment variable has a statistically significant 
joint impact on deposit flows for both types of depositors. 
Then, we turn our attention to examine whether UNCERTAINTY or 
MODAL_WEAK sentiment has a symmetric impact on firm deposits (DFLOWS_F) and 
household deposits (DFLOWS_H), respectively, and if not, then which prevails. Given that 
the test of symmetry of absolute effects is rejected, we conclude that each textual sentiment 
does not have a symmetric impact on deposit flows. A natural question that arises here is 
which type of depositors incurs the greatest impact. Our results suggest that the impact of 
each textual sentiment is stronger on firms, denoting that firm deposits are more sensitive 
in changes of textual sentiment than household deposits. 
*****Insert Table 4 here***** 
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5.2 Sensitivity Analysis  
Thus far, we find that both textual sentiment variables influence in a negative manner 
depositors’ choice to withdraw their deposits. In order to check the robustness of our 
empirical findings, we conduct sensitivity analysis based on four variants of the previous 
analysis. 
In the first sensitivity analysis, we re-estimate the previously discussed models 
including two additional explanatory variables. Particularly, we examine whether CRISIS 
and FINCENT have any impact on DFLOWS (both total and by type of depositor). CRISIS 
is a dummy variable capturing the first years of the recent financial crisis (i.e. 2008, 2009 
and 2010), while FINCENT is a dummy variable that captures the so-called financial 
centers in EU, that is Luxemburg, Malta and Cyprus (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2010). The 
rationale behind the inclusion of the CRISIS dummy is to make certain that the crisis effect 
does not determine the outcome of our findings. In addition, we believe that the EU 
countries that are considered to be financial centers will have higher deposit inflows than 
the other EU countries. Hence, we would normally anticipate a positive and a negative sign 
for FINCENT and CRISIS, respectively. From the results shown in Tables 5 and 6 we infer 
that our results remain robust even when we enhance the baseline regressions with 
additional control variables.  
*****Insert Tables 5 and 6 here***** 
Then we re-estimate our models winsorizing DFLOWS at the 1st and 99th percentiles 
of its empirical distribution. The rationale behind this sensitivity analysis is to avoid any 
outliers as possible driving forces of our baseline inferences. The results, reported in Tables 
7 and 8, indicate that our results are not dependent on outliers, since both textual sentiment 
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metrics retain their significant negative sign. 
*****Insert Tables 7 and 8 here***** 
The financial turmoil of 2008 had considerably more severe effects in the Western 
European countries, where financial institutions realized substantial losses due to a higher 
exposure to sovereign debt (Chan-Lau et. al., 2015). On the other hand, it appears that the 
financial institutions of Eastern Europe countries were less affected by the 2008 financial 
crisis, since banks in these countries were less exposed to sovereign debt than their Western 
counterparts (Efthyvoulou and Yidrim, 2014).  
Therefore, to provide additional insights, we conduct an additional sensitivity analysis 
where we break the sample into Eastern and Western countries9. The results reported in 
Tables 9 and 10 indicate that when we separate our sample into the Eastern and the Western 
region, the main results are merely unaffected in the Western region.  
*****Insert Tables 9 and 10 here***** 
We conduct a final sensitivity analysis where we apply Principal Component Analysis 
(PCA), in order to isolate the common factor between UNCERTAINTY and 
MODAL_WEAK. The main merit of PCA is that it aggregates the already existing 
information in the two different textual sentiment indices into a single ex-ante uncertainty 
indicator. Thus, the key independent variable is now the first principal component after the 
PCA (PC1). We take into consideration only the first principal component as the common 
factor between the two textual sentiment metrics, since it was found to explain almost 90% 
                                                 
9We define as Western countries Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom, whilst as 
Eastern EU countries we specify Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, 
Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. 
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of the joint variation of UNCERTAINTY and MODAL_WEAK sentiment. This elicited 
first principal component also gives a sense of the dimensionality of the two word lists. 
From the results reported in Tables 11 and 12 we observe that PC1 has a negative and 
statistically significant impact on DFLOWS, denoting that it consists of a valuable proxy 
for uncertainty. This result also suggests that the two word lists are probably capturing the 
same feature which is in line with Loughran and McDonald (2013). 
*****Insert Tables 11 and 12 here***** 
6. Conclusions 
In this study we set out to investigate whether the so-called textual sentiment, captured 
by the monthly speeches of the ECB’s president, is related to EU bank deposit flows during 
the period 2008M2 to 2017M2. Although there is a significant amount of literature 
suggesting several factors as determinants of bank deposit flows and bank runs, this work 
constitutes the first study investigating the impact of textual sentiment on European bank 
deposit flows. We find evidence that depositors’ perceived fear, captured by the proportion 
of uncertainty or weak modal words appearing in the ECB president’s monthly speeches, 
consists of a very important reason behind excessive deposit withdrawals. To put it another 
way, the propensity of both households and non-financial corporations to withdraw their 
bank deposits increases when more uncertain and weak modal words appear in the monthly 
speeches of the president of the ECB. Finally, we document that there is an asymmetric 
DFLOWS sensitivity on each textual sentiment across deposits on different sector. In 
particular, we find that firm deposits are more sensitive in changes of textual sentiment 
than household deposits. 
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Our results retain their significance after the conduct of a variety of robustness checks 
and hence we conclude that both ex-ante uncertainty measures we propose could be 
considered as valid measures of depositors’ perceived fear. More importantly, the proposed 
uncertainty metrics should be used as early warning signals of potential bank runs and, by 
extension, policy makers should take them into consideration when they design and 
implement their policies. Furthermore, our findings imply that an overly pessimistic speech 
from the ECB president could act as a self-fulfilling prophecy.  
Regarding future research directions, this study can be extended in many ways. First, 
an interesting research question is whether the proposed textual sentiment metrics have any 
impact on depositors’ decisions regarding the direction of deposit outflows. However, such 
an investigation needs bilateral data of bank deposit flows and a gravity model setup. 
Second, potential future research could extend our framework to investigate beyond the 
monthly speeches of the ECB’s president. For instance, monthly speeches derived from 
each country’s central bank could be explored instead. Third, a line of research would be 
interesting to study whether the impact of textual sentiment on bank deposit flows becomes 
higher or lower depending on the EU citizens’ trust in the ECB. Finally, alternative 
econometric methodologies or other control variables could also be examined.  
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Tables 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Total Deposit Flows by country (in millions of euro) 
Country min mean max 
Austria -9,490.00 1,297.58 14,423.00 
Belgium -9,662.00 2,900.38 19,801.00 
Bulgaria -2,500.00 328.92 4,119.00 
Croatia -3,084.00 202.11 7,847.00 
Cyprus -2,093.00 340.95 3,571.00 
Czech Republic -6,487.00 6,570.77 38,928.00 
Estonia -438.00 118.07 573.00 
Finland -6,004.00 742.77 8,789.00 
France -46,644.00 12,296.77 87,796.00 
Germany -39,434.00 8,889.24 55,106.00 
Greece -16,793.00 -780.61 11,274.00 
Hungary -7,663.00 43.21 5,754.00 
Ireland -20,604.00 250.44 14,810.00 
Italy -59,577.00 7,039.36 78,249.00 
Latvia -10,509.00 1,480.56 13,663.00 
Lithuania -844.00 4,339.67 18,025.460 
Luxembourg -21,925.00 430.95 15,782.680 
Malta -560.00 5,682.01 25,625.00 
Netherlands -34,585.00 1,116.51 27,717.00 
Poland -5,255.00 15,874.18 179,400.00 
Portugal -7,446.00 734.93 20,283.00 
Romania -9,629.00 1,405.91 9,472.00 
Slovakia -2,134.00 507.26 3,199.00 
Slovenia -2,234.00 229.97 1,394.00 
Spain -89,412.00 379.46 54,031.00 
Sweden -9,580.00 2,083.84 13,786.00 
UK 831,476.00 1,140,616.00 1,523,021.00 
Notes: This table reports the summary statistics of total deposit flows by country in millions of euro. 
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Table 2: Variable Definition, Expected Sign and Data Sources 
Variable Definition Expected sign Source 
Panel A: Dependent variable and main explanatory variables of interest 
DFLOWS 
Total Domestic Deposit Flows from both households 
and non-profit institutions and non-financial 
corporations 
- 
ECB Statistical 
Data Warehouse DFLOWS_H Domestic Deposit Flows from households - 
DFLOWS_F Domestic Deposit Flows from non-financial 
corporations - 
UNCERTAINTY 
Percentage of words in the speeches of the ECB 
president that are on the Loughran and McDonald 
(2011) uncertainty word list. Examples of uncertainty 
words include “doubt”, “fluctuate”, “exposure”, 
“riskier”, “speculate” and “depend” 
Negative 
ECB, Own 
Calculations 
MODAL_WEAK 
Percentage of words in the speeches of ECB 
president that are on the Loughran and McDonald 
(2011) weak modal word list. Examples of weak 
modal words include “might”, “may”, “perhaps”, 
“possible” and “seldom” 
Negative 
Panel B: Control variables 
YIELD Long Term Government Bond Yields Uncertain 
OECD IPI Industrial Production Index Uncertain 
SHARE_PRICES Share price Index Positive 
ESI Economic Sentiment Indicator Positive 
EUROSTAT 
UNEMPLOYMENT Unemployment Rate Negative 
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Table 3: Baseline regressions – system-GMM estimation 
Variables Total Deposit Flows Uncertainty Modal_Weak 
   
DFLOWS (t-1) 0.958*** 0.959*** 
 [0.045] [0.045] 
UNCERTAINTY (t-1) -2.440* - 
 [0.827]  
MODAL_WEAK (t-1) - -5.678** 
  [2.617] 
UNEMPLOYMENT 3.721 4.299 
 [16.716] [16.421] 
YIELD -1.791 -1.774 
 [2.774] [2.770] 
IPI 3.087 3.113 
 [3.220] [3.100] 
ESI 21.835 21.351 
 [18.974] [18.796] 
SHARE_PRICES 0.061* 0.075* 
 [0.035] [0.038] 
Constant 4.508*** 4.198*** 
 [1.577] [1.485] 
Observations 1,695 
AR(1) (p-value) 0.024** 0.025** 
AR(2) (p-value) 0.162 0.159 
Sargan (p-value) 0.982 0.981 
Notes: (a) The dependent variable of each specification is on the first line of the table, while the 
main under-examination variable of each specification is on the second line of the table, (b) The 
variables are defined in Table 2, (c) *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 
percent level respectively, (d) numbers in brackets denote robust standard errors, (e) AR(1), AR(2) 
and Sargan test are the Arellano–Bond tests for first and second order autocorrelation of the 
residuals and Sargan is the test for overidentifying restrictions.  
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Table 4: Baseline regressions – SUREG estimation  
Deposit Flows by type of depositor 
Variables Uncertainty Modal_Weak Firms Households Firms Households 
     
DFLOWS_F (t-1) 0.973*** - 0.973*** - 
 
[0.005] 
 
[0.005] 
 
DFLOWS_H (t-1) - -0.111*** - -0.110*** 
  
[0.025] 
 
[0.024] 
UNCERTAINTY (t-1) -1.196*** 0.153 - - 
 
[0.430] [0.190] 
  
MODAL_WEAK (t-1) - - -2.798*** 0.157 
   
[0.919] [0.407] 
UNEMPLOYMENT 8.905* -0.633 8.803* -0.646 
 
[5.210] [2.304] [5.208] [2.304] 
YIELD -0.197 -0.839 -0.189 -0.841 
 
[1.167] [0.516] [1.166] [0.516] 
IPI -0.666 2.239* -0.696 2.251* 
 
[2.814] [1.244] [2.813] [1.245] 
ESI 10.415* -0.923 10.416* -0.903 
 
[6.108] [2.701] [6.105] [2.701] 
SHARE_PRICES 0.015 0.029** 0.023 0.028* 
 
[0.033] [0.015] [0.033] [0.015] 
Constant 1.712 0.993* 1.391 1.119** 
 
[1.159] [0.512] [1.096] [0.485] 
     
Number of observations 1,695 
Country dummies Included 
Time dummies Included 
Hypothesis testing 
Joint zero effect of each 
textual sentiment on the 
deposit flows of firms and 
households  
8.73** 8.67*** 
Symmetry of absolute 
effects of each textual 
sentiment across the 
deposit flows of firms and 
households  
9.61*** 9.07*** 
Notes: (a) The main under-examination explanatory variable is on the second line of the table, while the 
dependent variable of each specification is on the third line of the table, (b) The variables are defined in 
Table 2, (c) *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level respectively, (d) 
numbers in brackets denote robust standard errors.  
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Table 5: Robustness checks – system-GMM estimation (Including additional 
explanatory variables) 
Variables Total Deposit Flows Uncertainty Modal_Weak 
   
DFLOWS (t-1) 0.959*** 0.958*** 
 [0.046] [0.046] 
UNCERTAINTY (t-1) -2.183*** - 
 [0.791]  
MODAL_WEAK (t-1) - -5.421** 
  [2.631] 
UNEMPLOYMENT 2.849 2.502 
 [16.704] [16.529] 
YIELD -1.758 -1.727 
 [2.749] [2.735] 
IPI 3.028 2.972 
 [3.253] [3.148] 
ESI 21.936 21.760 
 [18.968] [18.868] 
SHARE_PRICES 0.064* 0.075** 
 [0.035] [0.037] 
FINCENT 8.941 8.919 
 [30.601] [30.727] 
CRISIS -0.819* -1.499** 
 [0.476] [0.584] 
Constant 3.929* 3.934 
 [2.259] [2.572] 
Observations 1,695 
AR(1) (p-value) 0.024** 0.025** 
AR(2) (p-value) 0.161 0.158 
Sargan (p-value) 0.984 0.984 
Notes: (a) The dependent variable of each specification is on the first line of the table, while the 
main under-examination variable of each specification is on the second line of the table, (b) The 
variables are defined in Table 2, (c) *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 
percent level respectively, (d) numbers in brackets denote robust standard errors, (e) AR(1), AR(2) 
and Sargan test are the Arellano–Bond tests for first and second order autocorrelation of the 
residuals and Sargan is the test for overidentifying restrictions.  
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Table 6: Robustness checks – SUREG estimation (Including additional explanatory variables) 
Deposit Flows by type of depositor 
Variables Uncertainty Modal_Weak Firms Households Firms Households 
     
DFLOWS_F (t-1) 0.973*** - 0.973*** - 
 
[0.005] 
 
[0.005] 
 
DFLOWS_H (t-1) - -0.110*** - -0.110*** 
 
 
[0.024] 
 
[0.024] 
UNCERTAINTY (t-1) -1.196*** 0.153 - - 
 
[0.430] [0.190] 
  
MODAL_WEAK (t-1) - - -2.798*** 0.157 
   
[0.919] [0.407] 
UNEMPLOYMENT 8.905* -0.633 8.803* -0.646 
 
[5.210] [2.304] [5.208] [2.304] 
YIELD -0.197 -0.839 -0.189 -0.841 
 
[1.167] [0.516] [1.166] [0.516] 
IPI -0.666 2.240* -0.696 2.251* 
 
[2.814] [1.245] [2.813] [1.244] 
ESI 10.415* -0.923 10.416* -0.903 
 
[6.108] [2.702] [6.106] [2.701] 
SHARE_PRICES 0.015 0.029** 0.023 0.028* 
 
[0.033] [0.015] [0.033] [0.015] 
FINCENT 0.043 -0.407 0.033 -0.405 
 
[1.002] [0.443] [1.001] [0.443] 
CRISIS 2.321 0.877 1.840 0.976 
 
[1.421] [0.628] [1.384] [0.612] 
Constant -0.609 0.116 -0.449 0.143 
 
[1.393] [0.616] [1.398] [0.619] 
Number of observations 1,695 
Country dummies Included 
Time dummies Included 
Hypothesis testing 
Joint zero effect of each 
textual sentiment on the 
deposit flows of firms 
and households  
8.73** 9.61*** 
Symmetry of absolute 
effects of each textual 
sentiment across the 
deposit flows of firms 
and households  
8.67*** 9.07*** 
Notes: (a) The main under-examination explanatory variable is on the second line of the table, while the 
dependent variable of each specification is on the third line of the table, (b) The variables are defined in 
Table 2, (c) *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level respectively, (d) 
numbers in brackets denote robust standard errors.  
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Table 7: Robustness checks – system-GMM estimation (Winsorizing DFLOWS) 
Variables Total Deposit Flows Uncertainty Modal_Weak 
   
DFLOWS (t-1) 0.892*** 0.892*** 
 [0.106] [0.105] 
UNCERTAINTY (t-1) -2.110*** - 
 [0.709]  
MODAL_WEAK (t-1) - -3.367* 
  [1.959] 
UNEMPLOYMENT -0.928 -0.056 
 [11.956] [11.688] 
YIELD -0.208 -0.184 
 [2.344] [2.351] 
IPI 1.548 1.525 
 [3.352] [3.273] 
ESI 1.885 1.361 
 [11.075] [10.881] 
SHARE_PRICES 0.033 0.045 
 [0.031] [0.031] 
Constant 7.343*** 6.589*** 
 [2.647] [2.287] 
Observations 1,695 
AR(1) (p-value) 0.021** 0.021** 
AR(2) (p-value) 0.202 0.198 
Sargan (p-value) 0.989 0.989 
Notes: (a) The dependent variable of each specification is on the first line of the table, while the 
main under-examination variable of each specification is on the second line of the table, (b) The 
variables are defined in Table 2, (c) *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 
percent level respectively, (d) numbers in brackets denote robust standard errors, (e) AR(1), AR(2) 
and Sargan test are the Arellano–Bond tests for first and second order autocorrelation of the 
residuals and Sargan is the test for overidentifying restrictions.  
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Table 8: Robustness checks– SUREG estimation (Winsorizing DFLOWS) 
Deposit Flows by type of depositor 
Variables Uncertainty Modal_Weak Firms Households Firms Households 
     
DFLOWS_F (t-1) 0.965*** - 0.965*** - 
 [0.006]  [0.006]  
DFLOWS_H (t-1) - -0.077*** - -0.077*** 
  [0.024]  [0.024] 
UNCERTAINTY (t-1) -0.789** 0.161 - - 
 [0.345] [0.183]   
MODAL_WEAK (t-1) - - -1.432* 0.216 
   [0.739] [0.392] 
UNEMPLOYMENT 6.088 -0.515 6.075 -0.522 
 [4.188] [2.221] [4.190] [2.222] 
YIELD -0.447 -0.852* -0.438 -0.855* 
 [0.938] [0.497] [0.938] [0.498] 
IPI -0.905 2.378** -0.942 2.389** 
 [2.262] [1.200] [2.263] [1.200] 
ESI 1.854 -0.576 1.813 -0.560 
 [4.910] [2.604] [4.912] [2.604] 
SHARE_PRICES 0.014 0.026* 0.018 0.026* 
 [0.027] [0.014] [0.027] [0.014] 
Constant 1.197 0.909* 0.808 1.021** 
 [0.932] [0.494] [0.881] [0.467] 
     
Number of observations 1,695 
Country dummies Included 
Time dummies Included 
Hypothesis testing 
Joint zero effect of each 
textual sentiment on 
the deposit flows of 
firms and households 
6.46** 4.31 
Symmetry of absolute 
effects of each textual 
sentiment across the 
deposit flows of firms 
and households 
6.44** 4.22** 
Notes: (a) The main under-examination explanatory variable is on the second line of the table, while the 
dependent variable of each specification is on the third line of the table, (b) The variables are defined in 
Table 2, (c) *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level respectively, (d) 
numbers in brackets denote robust standard errors. 
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Table 9: Robustness checks – system-GMM estimation (Breaking the sample into Western and Eastern 
countries) 
Total Deposit Flows 
Variables 
Uncertainty Modal_Weak 
Eastern  
countries 
Western 
countries 
Eastern  
countries 
Western 
countries 
     
DFLOWS (t-1) 0.039 0.958*** 0.043 0.958*** 
 
[0.058] [0.046] [0.061] [0.046] 
UNCERTAINTY (t-1) 0.110 -2.925*** - - 
 
[0.129] [1.002] 
  
MODAL_WEAK (t-1) - - -0.499 -6.961** 
   
[0.436] [3.295] 
UNEMPLOYMENT -0.923* 0.487 -1.154*** 1.230 
 
[0.478] [31.571] [0.437] [31.009] 
YIELD 1.094 -2.035 1.201 -2.005 
 
[1.981] [2.981] [2.069] [2.972] 
IPI -4.380 6.799** -4.420 6.686** 
 
[5.047] [2.795] [5.066] [2.721] 
ESI -7.167 35.349 -7.314* 34.642 
 
[4.438] [25.715] [4.369] [25.422] 
SHARE_PRICES -0.005 0.095** -0.007 0.112** 
 
[0.039] [0.042] [0.041] [0.046] 
Constant 0.508*** 5.782*** 0.753** 5.452*** 
 
[0.195] [1.975] [0.354] [1.891] 
Observations 433 1,262 433 1,262 
AR(1) (p-value) 0.185 0.026** 0.184 0.027** 
AR(2) (p-value) 0.344 0.161 0.343 0.158 
Sargan (p-value) 0.100 0.995 0.000*** 0.996 
Notes: (a) The dependent variable of each specification is on the first line of the table, while the main 
under-examination variable of each specification is on the second line of the table, (b) The variables are 
defined in Table 2, (c) *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level 
respectively, (d) numbers in brackets denote robust standard errors, (e) AR(1), AR(2) and Sargan test are 
the Arellano–Bond tests for first and second order autocorrelation of the residuals and Sargan is the test 
for overidentifying restrictions.  
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Table 10: Robustness checks – SUREG estimation (Breaking the sample into Western and Eastern countries) 
 
Deposit Flows by type of depositor 
VARIABLES Eastern countries Western countries Uncertainty Modal_Weak Uncertainty Modal_Weak 
   Firms Households  Firms Households  Firms Households Firms Households  
         
DFLOWS_F (t-1) -0.244*** - -0.244*** - 0.973*** - 0.973*** - [0.047]  [0.047]  [0.006]  [0.006]  
DFLOWS_H (t-1) - 0.061 - 0.061 - -0.154*** - -0.154*** 
 [0.049]  [0.049]  [0.028]  [0.028] 
UNCERTAINTY (t-1) 0.037 -0.045 - - -1.628*** 0.213 - - [0.073] [0.309]   [0.578] [0.231]   
MODAL_WEAK (t-1) - - 0.096 -0.192 - - -3.822*** 0.258 
  [0.156] [0.665]   [1.234] [0.493] 
UNEMPLOYMENT 0.048 -0.560 0.050 -0.572 15.902* -0.198 15.605* -0.198 [0.667] [2.848] [0.667] [2.848] [8.388] [3.344] [8.384] [3.346] 
YIELD -0.274 0.707 -0.279 0.716 -0.155 -0.962* -0.156 -0.965* [0.418] [1.780] [0.418] [1.780] [1.390] [0.554] [1.389] [0.554] 
IPI -0.270 -2.798 -0.275 -2.791 -0.645 3.019** -0.743 3.043** [0.592] [2.539] [0.592] [2.539] [3.565] [1.422] [3.562] [1.422] 
ESI 0.364 -4.151 0.378 -4.195 14.687* 0.478 14.867* 0.528 [0.997] [4.243] [0.997] [4.246] [8.499] [3.388] [8.495] [3.390] 
SHARE_PRICES -0.002 -0.001 -0.003 -0.000 0.013 0.039** 0.024 0.038** [0.006] [0.025] [0.006] [0.025] [0.044] [0.018] [0.044] [0.018] 
Constant 0.004 1.089 0.011 1.113* 2.232 0.594 1.803 0.754 
 
[0.169] [0.718] [0.155] [0.661] [1.449] [0.578] [1.356] [0.541] 
Observations 433 1,262 
Country dummies Included 
Time dummies Included 
Hypothesis testing 
Joint zero effect of each 
textual sentiment on the 
deposit flows of firms and 
households 
0.29 0.47 9.12** 10.08*** 
Symmetry of absolute 
effects of each textual 
sentiment across the 
deposit flows of firms and 
households 
0.07 0.18 9.11*** 9.81*** 
Notes: (a) The main under-examination explanatory variable is on the third line of the table, while the dependent variable of each specification is on the 
fourth line of the table, (b) The variables are defined in Table 2, (c) *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level respectively, 
(d) numbers in brackets denote robust standard errors. 
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Table 11: Robustness checks – system-GMM estimation (Principal Component 
Analysis) 
Variables Total Deposit Flows PC1 
  
DFLOWS (t-1) 0.959*** 
 [0.046] 
PC1 (t-1) -0.843*** 
 [0.314] 
UNEMPLOYMENT 3.810 
 [16.548] 
YIELD -1.788 
 [2.767] 
IPI 3.119 
 [3.152] 
ESI 21.637 
 [18.900] 
SHARE_PRICES 0.067* 
 [0.037] 
Constant 2.391** 
 [0.992] 
Observations 1,695 
AR(1) (p-value) 0.024** 
AR(2) (p-value) 0.161 
Sargan (p-value) 0.982 
Notes: (a) The dependent variable of each specification is on the first line of the table, while the 
main under-examination variable is on the second line of the table, (b) The variables are defined in 
Table 2, (c) *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level respectively, 
(d) numbers in brackets denote robust standard errors, (e) AR(1), AR(2) and Sargan test are the 
Arellano–Bond tests for first and second order autocorrelation of the residuals and Sargan is the 
test for overidentifying restrictions.  
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Table 12: Robustness checks – SUREG estimation (Principal Component 
Analysis) 
Deposit Flows by type of depositor 
Variables PC1 
 Firms Households 
   
DFLOWS_F (t-1) 0.973*** - 
 [0.005]  
DFLOWS_H (t-1) - -0.110*** 
 
 
[0.024] 
PC1 (t-1) -0.410*** 0.036 
 [0.134] [0.059] 
UNEMPLOYMENT 8.821* -0.636 
 [5.208] [2.304] 
YIELD -0.196 -0.840 
 [1.166] [0.516] 
IPI -0.668 2.245* 
 [2.813] [1.245] 
ESI 10.446* -0.915 
 [6.105] [2.701] 
SHARE_PRICES 0.019 0.029* 
 [0.033] [0.015] 
Constant 0.630 1.148** 
 [1.032] [0.457] 
Number of observations 1,695 
Country dummies Included 
Time dummies Included 
Hypothesis testing 
Joint zero effect of each 
textual sentiment on the 
deposit flows of firms and 
households  
10.08*** 
Symmetry of absolute effects 
of each textual sentiment 
across the deposit flows of 
firms and households  
9.80*** 
Notes: (a) The main under-examination explanatory variable is on the second line of the table, 
while the dependent variable of each specification is on the third line of the table, (b) The variables 
are defined in Table 2, (c) *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level 
respectively, (d) numbers in brackets denote robust standard errors. 
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Figures 
 
Figure 1: Trajectory between total deposit flows and each textual sentiment variable - 
Average across all EU countries 
 
Notes: These figures depict the evolution of total deposit flows (DFLOWS) and each textual 
sentiment variable for the under-examination period (i.e. 2008M2 to 2017M2). Especially, the 
upper (lower) graph demonstrates an inverse association between DFLOWS and 
UNCERTAINTY (MODAL_WEAK). 
Source: ECB, Own Estimations 
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